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Maximum Carbon Intensity Limitations and
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.*
Emission of greenhouse gases is a global problem. Any nation seeking to restrict such
emissions by its manufacturers should avoid putting them at a disadvantage in world and
domestic markets where they are likely to compete with producers that do not bear the
cost of emission controls. One approach being considered in the United States would be
adoption of technical regulations limiting the carbon intensity of basic products, such as
cement, aluminum, steel, etc., offered for sale in the US market (carbon intensity would be
defined as the C02 equivalent emissions per ton of product). Domestic and imported prod-
ucts that exceed the regulation limit could not be sold in US commerce, except pursuant
to exceptions that would be available on a national treatment basis. Technical regulations
would be based on the quantity of carbon equivalent gases emitted in the production of a
unit of product, such as a ton of steel. The regulations would set a numerical limit on car-
bon intensity; would set discrete limits for different products and types of manufacture;
would require auditable facility measurement but could allow compliance on an average
company-wide basis; and would be tightened over time to encourage new technologies.
However, there would be no requirement for the adoption of specific technologies.
The article will analyze the validity of such regulations under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).' The
preamble to the TBT Agreement recognizes that "no country should be prevented from
taking measures necessary ... for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health,
[or] of the environment ... at the levels it considers appropriate" In addition, TBT
Agreement Article 2.2 includes "protection of human health or safety ... or the environ-
ment" as legitimate objectives of technical regulations. The article will examine whether
a maximum carbon emission limit would be a "[t/echnical regulation' as defined by the
TBT Agreement Annex i.i, taking into account the WTO Appellate Body statement that
characteristics subject to regulation are not limited to "qualities intrinsic to the product
itself" Consideration will also be given to the TBTAgreement requirement that technical
regulations should not be applied so as to create unnecessary obstacles to trade. Finally,
there will be an evaluation of the application of Article III of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 to measures that qualify as technical regulations.
I. Introduction incorporated in legislation reported out of the Se-
nate Committee on Environment and Public
In 2007, both houses of the US Congress began seri- Works, would require the US government to adopt
ous consideration of proposals to regulate carbon a "cap and trade" system that would apply to do-
emissions in response to escalating concerns about mestic carbon emitters and, ultimately, to imports.
3
global warming. One approach, which has been In broad outline, such a cap and trade system
Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Partner, Wiley Rein, Washington, D.C., 2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, contained in the
and Senior Lecturing Fellow, Duke University School of Law, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Durham, North Carolina. Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1994, p. 1153 ff.
1 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 18 I.L.M. 1979, 3 110th Congress, American Climate Security Act, S. 2191 (2007),
p. 1079 ff. www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl 10-2191.
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would establish aggregate limits ("caps") on emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, me-
thane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases) from all
direct sources of emissions in the US economy,
including power generation, manufacturing, and
possibly transportation. The "cap" would be divided
into allowances, which would be allocated to oper-
ating entities either by auction or based on tradi-
tional emission levels. Domestic entities would
have to submit allowances to a federal authority
equal to their annual greenhouse gas emissions.
Entities that emit gases below their limit could sell
or trade excess allowances to other entities that do
not meet their emission limits.4 Recognizing that
US industry would be at a competitive disadvan-
tage if foreign manufacturers of products for the
domestic market in the United States are not sub-
ject to comparable emission limits, proposals now
under consideration in Congress require that
importers would also have to provide allowances
covering the greenhouse gases emitted in the coun-
try of origin, or otherwise demonstrate compliance
with emission limits comparable to those applica-
ble to domestic producers.
5
Concerned about the cost of mandatory partici-
pation in a cap and trade system, and the uncertain
global reach of pending legislative proposals, cer-
tain US industries have proposed as an alternative
the adoption of federally mandated maximum car-
bon intensities for certain basic products (e.g., steel,
paper, aluminum, plastics, cement, and so on).6
Under this system, manufacturers of basic products
would be exempt from allowance requirements.
The proposed limitations would be based on the
quantity of carbon equivalent gases (the "carbon
intensity") emitted in the production of a unit of
product, such as a ton of steel or cement. The meas-
ure would set discrete numerical limits on carbon
intensity for different products and manufacturing
processes that would be tightened over time to limit
emissions and encourage new technologies. Pro-
ducts with carbon intensities that exceed the maxi-
mum would not be permitted for sale in US com-
merce, regardless of where they are produced,
except pursuant to exceptions that would be avail-
able equally for domestic and imported products.
A carbon intensity technical regulation applied
alike to domestic and imported products would be
justified as necessary to protect both human life
and the environment from the risks associated with
excessive carbon emissions. Emissions from US
and foreign sources contribute to global green-
house gas concentrations and migrate through the
atmosphere of the United States as well as other
countries. The proposed measure would require
domestic producers to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and foreign producers would have to do so as
well in order to have access to the US market. The
application of the carbon intensity limits to
imports, as well as domestic production, would be
necessary to avoid giving imports produced with-
out carbon intensity limitations an unfair competi-
tive advantage in the US market. Whether that
would be consistent with the international obliga-
tions of the US is the issue considered in this
Article.
The WTO obligations of the United States, in-
cluding GATT 1994 Articles III and XI, 7 are gene-
rally applicable to restrictions on imports. However,
this paper argues that a measure imposing limits on
carbon intensity that is adopted consistent with the
TBT Agreement would not be subject to either
GATT 1994 Articles III or XI. Otherwise, a measure
that is consistent with the TBT Agreement could be
invalidated if it is found to be inconsistent with
GATT 1994. This anomalous result is precluded by
the WTO Agreement, which provides that in the
case of a conflict with GATT 1994, the TBT Agree-
ment should prevail.
A measure is consistent with the TBT Agreement
if it is a technical regulation that lays down manda-
tory product characteristics, is non-discriminatory,
is adopted consistent with the specified procedural
requirements, and is not unnecessarily trade-
restrictive. Application of the TBT Agreement to a
measure similar to that proposed to limit green-
house gas emissions from basic manufacturing has
never been authoritatively considered by a WTO
panel or the Appellate Body. However, based on the
Preamble and terms of the TBT Agreement, and
4 See Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on
Energy and Air Quality, Climate Change Legislation Design
White Paper: Competitiveness Concerns/Engaging Developing
Countries, January 31, 2008, p. 8-10, http://energycommerce.
house.gov/ClimateChange/WhitePaper.Competitive-
ness.01 31 08.pdf.
5 Ibid. See also S.2191, supra, note 4, TitleVil, Global Efforts to
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, sections 6001-6007.
6 See, generally, Climate Change White Paper, supra, note 4,
pp. 1 0-11.
7 GATT Article III requires national treatment on internal taxation
and regulation; Article II requires general elimination of quanti-
tive restrictions.
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statements in Appellate Body decisions concerning
the meaning of technical regulations as that term is
used in the TBT Agreement, there are persuasive
arguments that a measure establishing maximum
carbon intensities would be found to be a technical
regulation that would comply with the Agreement
if the salient principles and procedures are scrupu-
lously followed.
II. The TBT Agreement Places Special
Emphasis on Protection
of the Environment
Protection of the environment and human health
are specifically recognized as legitimate bases for
regulation by WTO members pursuant to the TBT
Agreement. The Preamble to the TBT Agreement
"recognizes" that "no country should be prevented
from taking measures necessary ... for the protec-
tion of human, animal or plant life or health" or "of
the environment ... at levels it considers appropri-
ate." The exercise of this authority should, however,
not result in measures that are "applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised
restriction on international trade." This admonition
is echoed in TBT Agreement Article 2.2, which
states that technical regulations should "not be
more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a
legitimate objective." Then, Article 2.2 lists "protec-
tion of human health or safety ... or the environ-
ment" as legitimate objectives of technical regula-
tions. The Preamble's emphasis on the right of
countries to take measures necessary for the pro-
tection of the environment and human health
should inform the interpretation of the TBT
Agreement provisions.
8
8 According to theVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT), 8 I.L.M. 1969, p. 679 ff., Article 31, Preambles are part of
the context which must be evaluated in treaty interpretation.
9 TBT Agreement, Annex 1.1.
10 European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbe-
stos-Containing Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO
Doc. WT/DS/AB/R, paras. 66 f.
III. A Measure Regulating Carbon Inten-
sity Would be a Technical Regulation
as defined by the TBT Agreement
A "technical regulation" is defined by Annex 1.1 of
the TBT Agreement as a "[d]ocument which lays
down product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods, including the
applicable administrative provisions, with which
compliance is mandatory".9 Thus, the first question
is whether a carbon intensity regulation would lay
down "product characteristics" given that the regu-
lation would relate to carbon emitted during the
manufacture of steel and other basic products.
Since the emitted carbon would not be in the prod-
uct at the time of sale (or, in the case of foreign
products, at the time of sale after importation), each
product would have to be identified by the carbon
emissions during its production at the producing
facility either on a product-by-product or process-by
process-basis. The issue then is whether that identi-
fier is a characteristic of the product as that term is
used in the TBT Agreement.
The Appellate Body in EC - Asbestos1 0 consid-
ered whether a ban by France on asbestos, and
products containing asbestos, violated the TBT
Agreement as a technical regulation that was more
restrictive of trade than necessary. In considering
whether the French regulation was a technical reg-
ulation, the Appellate Body first addressed the issue
whether the regulation prescribed a "characteristic".
The Appellate Body stated that the word "character-
istic" as used in the TBT Agreement has a number
of "synonyms that are helpful in understanding the
ordinary meaning of that word". The characteristics
of a product include "any objectively definable 'fea-
tures, 'qualities,' 'attributes,' or other 'distinguishing
mark' of a product." This sentence is followed by a
statement that such "characteristics' might relate,
inter alia, to a product's composition, size, shape,
colour, texture, hardness, tensile strength, flamma-
bility, conductivity, density or viscosity." And, the
Appellate Body further stated that product charac-
teristics "include, not only features and qualities
intrinsic to the product itself, but also related 'char-
acteristics,' such as the means of identification". In
support of this conclusion, the Appellate Body
referred to Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, which
gives as examples of product characteristics "termi-
nology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
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requirements." According to the Appellate Body,
these "examples indicate that 'product characteris-
tics' include, not only features and qualities intrin-
sic to the product itself, but also related 'character-
istics,' such as the means of identification, the pres-
entation and the appearance of a product." 1
The conclusion that the "characteristics" subject
to the TBT Agreement do not need to be intrinsic to
the product itself was also emphasized in EC -
Sardines. 1 2 That decision involved the WTO con-
sistency of a measure by the European Union that
permitted only fish of the species Sardinia
pilchardus to be labeled and marketed as preserved
sardines. Peru, which is a major exporter of sar-
dines (but not of the species Sardinia pilchardus),
challenged the regulation as an impermissible tech-
nical regulation, arguing that the international stan-
dard, the Codex Alimentarius, provides that fish
from other species can be sold as sardines, so long
as either the species or the geographical origin of
the fish is specified. The Appellate Body first noted
that "whether a measure is a 'technical regulation' is
a threshold issue because the outcome of this issue
determines whether the TBT Agreement is applica-
ble." Citing with approval the decision in EC -
Asbestos, the Appellate Body concluded that fea-
tures such as "means of identification" would be a
characteristic under the TBT Agreement because "a
name clearly identifies a product." Thus, an EC reg-
ulation relating to the marketing of "preserved sar-
dines which only included fish of the species
Sardinia pilchardus" laid down a characteristic that
was covered by the TBT Agreement. 
1 3
These precedents, while not directly on point, do
evidence a disposition to broadly define the term
"characteristics" as that term is used in the TBT
Agreement. And, for purposes of this analysis, the
important point that has been made by the
Appellate Body in construing this term is that "char-
acteristics" are not limited to "qualities intrinsic to
the product itself". Thus it would not be dispositive
that the carbon intensity of a basic product is meas-
ured during the production process and cannot be
derived from a physical analysis of the product
itself. What should be dispositive, instead, is
whether the carbon intensity of a basic product like
steel or cement can be "objectively" defined.
Assuming that to be the case, it would be reason-
able to anticipate that a carbon intensity regulation
would be viewed as a means of identification that
qualifies as a "characteristic" as that term is defined
in the TBT Agreement.
According to industry sources, the carbon inten-
sity of basic products can be "objectively" estab-
lished. For example, the International Iron and
Steel Institute has stated that the "steel industry has
collected, and will maintain, the most comprehen-
sive set of environmental data for its products."
This data includes "a detailed assessment of CO 2
emissions on a process-by-process or product
basis."14 In the case of steel, that record is intrinsic
to each ton and can be used as a means of identifi-
cation. It is the author's understanding that other
basic products have similar objectively derived data
on carbon emissions. It would, therefore, be practi-
cal to require a label or mark specifying carbon
intensity.
In sum, there is a strong case to be made that a
measure regulating carbon intensity would be a
deemed a "technical regulation" as defined in the
TBT Agreement and its Annex 1, even though the
emitted carbon does not reside in the basic product
at the time of sale or importation for sale. The
Appellate Body has indicated that it does not mat-
ter whether the characteristic is intrinsic to the
product itself as long as there is an objectively
defined means of identification. The amount of car-
bon emitted during product manufacture can be
measured and is, therefore, a distinguishing feature
of each individual unit.
A supple interpretation of "characteristic" would
be consistent with the Preamble to the TBT
Agreement, which "recognizes" that "no country
should be prevented from taking measures neces-
sary ... for the protection of human, animal or plant
life or health, of the environment ... at levels it con-
siders appropriate". Since international law on the
interpretation of treaties set out in the Vienna
Convention provides for the consideration of pre-
ambles as part of the "context" for treaty interpreta-
tion, this statement should inform the meaning
11 Ibid., para. 67.
12 European Communities Trade Description of Sardines, Report
of the Appellate Board, WTO Doc. WT/DS 231/AB/R, para. 6
("product characteristics may be intrinsic, or they may be related
to the product").
13 Ibid., para. 5.
14 International Iron and Steel Institute, A Policy to Reduce Steel-
related Greenhouse Gas Emissions, http://www.jernkontoret.se/
Jern Kontoret/pressmedde/anden/2007/climatechangepolicyfinal.
pdf, p. 4.
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given to "characteristics". In addition, Article 2.1
includes "protection of human health or safety ... or
the environment" as legitimate objectives of techni-
cal regulations. Since technical regulations adopted
with the objective of limiting carbon intensity
would be designed to protect the environment, and
would be a means of identification of the carbon
intensity of a specific unit of products affected by
the regulations, a conclusion that such regulations
lay down product "characteristics" would be war-
ranted, even though those characteristics are
defined during production and are not intrinsic to
the product itself.
In this connection, it is important to note that
the TBT Agreement specifically refers to process
production method (PPM) measures in the defini-
tion of a technical regulation. Specifically, Annex
1.1 defines a technical regulation as a measure that
applies to "product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods". PPMs are
therefore included within the meaning of technical
regulations if they are related to product character-
istics. According to an interpretive note by the
WTO Secretariat issued shortly after the adoption
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 15 the word
"their" was inserted "to ensure that the Agreement
will only address a narrow selection of processes
and production methods."1
6
The "narrow selection" of PPMs that are permit-
ted by the TBT Agreement has to be informed by
the definition of "characteristics" that has been
adopted by the Appellate Body. As noted above, the
term "characteristics" is not limited to features
intrinsic to the product itself. And, since there is a
good argument that carbon intensity limitations are
definable as "characteristics," there is also a similar-
ly good argument that such limitations would be
deemed "related process and production methods"
that are among the "narrow selection" of PPMs per-
mitted by the express language of the TBT
Agreement. 17
15 WTO Note Prepared by the Secretariat on its own Responsibility,
WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/1 0.
16 Ibid., para. 147.
17 "This provision [the definition of technical regulation] could be
interpreted as covering non-product related PPMs, making tech-
nical regulations on non-product related PPM's permissible pro-
vided they meet the other requirements of the TBT Agreement",
Green, "Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO", Jour-
nal of International Economic Law 2005, p. 1 60.
18 EC- Asbestos, supra, note 11, para. 68.
Finally, the definition of technical regulation in TBT
Agreement Annex 1.1 also states that compliance
with the product characteristics laid down must be
"mandatory", in that the regulation "has the effect of
prescribing or imposing one or more 'characteris-
tics'." As envisioned, the proposed technical regula-
tion would provide that products would have to
have a carbon intensity below a benchmark (with
differential levels based on manufacturing process,
etc.), in order to be sold in US commerce. This
seems to clearly meet the mandatory requirement.
Moreover, there would seem to be no bar to laying
down certain exceptions. In EC - Asbestos, the
Appellate Body indicated that "applicable adminis-
trative provisions" which objectively provide for
exceptions remain mandatory and within the defi-
nition of technical regulation.
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IV. The Like Product Requirement Would
not Preclude Application of CIM to
Domestic and Imported Products
The carbon intensity of a basic product would be
derived from the production process. As a practical
matter, it would appear necessary to adopt different
intensity limits for discrete processes even though
they result in like products. For example, the regu-
lations could include a carbon intensity limitation
for steel produced in the electric furnace (EAF)
method, which relies largely on scrap iron as the
"feed" or raw material input, and has a low level of
emissions. There is a different environmental
impact when similar steel is produced in the basic
oxygen furnace (BOF) method, which uses iron ore
(and some scrap) as the raw material. In this
process, the carbon emitted during production is
significantly greater than occurs in electric furnace
production, even though the production method
does not affect the physical characteristics of the
finished steel. For example, steel beams produced
in an electric furnace mill are, for the most part,
physically identical to beams produced in the BOF
mill. Notwithstanding this similarity in the end
products, it would seem logical and appropriate to
adopt discrete carbon intensity limits for steel pro-
duced by the two methods.
Article 2.1 requires Members to ensure that tech-
nical regulations do not discriminate between
imported and domestic like products, or among
imports from different WTOMember States. There
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is an issue here because a product produced in one
process common to the United States might have a
different intensity than the same product produced
in another process domestically or in a foreign
country. For example, domestic steel beams pro-
duced in the electric furnace process would have a
lower carbon intensity than foreign steel beams
produced in the basic oxygen furnace method, yet
all such beams would have similar characteristics as
far as the consumer is concerned. As a result, an
imported BOF beam would not be able to meet the
more stringent intensity standard that would apply
to either an imported or domestic EAF beam.1 9 Yet,
while all these beams would appear to be "like"
products by any commercial standard, the potential
for discriminatory treatment of BOF beams does
not necessarily indicate that carbon intensity regu-
lations would be prohibited by Article 2.1.
The definition of like products is a flexible con-
cept in WTO law. For example, in Japan -Alcoholic
Beverages, the Appellate Body observed that the
"accordion of 'likeness' stretches and squeezes in
different places as different provisions of the WTO
Agreement are applied."20 Despite this flexibility, it
is difficult to imagine a finding that EAF and BOF
steel beams are not "like" under the usual criteria
which consider (i) the physical properties, (ii) end
uses, (iii) consumer tastes and perceptions, and (iv)
tariff classifications.2 1 There are no differences
between EAF and BOF beams under these criteria
and they would clearly, therefore, be considered like
for purposes of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
But, the analysis must not stop there.
In the recent Appellate Body decision involving
Dominican Republic - Cigarettes, the Appellate
Body looked beyond mere likeness considerations
to hold that a detrimental effect on a like imported
product is acceptable as long as it is "explained by
factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign
origin of the product."2 2 This interpretation was
based on a reading of Article 11.4 of GATT 1994,
which has language relating to national origin that
is very similar to TBT Agreement Article 2.1. This
reasoning would justify different regulations for
electric furnace and BOF steel, even though the end
products of these processes are "like", because the
differential treatment would not be based on
national or foreign origin, but rather on the process.
In fact, the "differential treatment" would facili-
tate trade, since a carbon intensity regulation com-
mon to both EAF and BOF beams would potential-
ly be a much greater burden on imports. For exam-
ple, an intensity regulation based solely on EAF
best practices would be an impossible hurdle for an
imported BOF product. Therefore, recognition of
the process differential in the establishment of
intensity limits would avoid creating "a disguised
restriction on international trade" in like products.
Moreover, it would be consistent with the admoni-
tion of TBT Agreement Article 2.2 that technical
regulations "not be more trade restrictive than nec-
essary to fulfill a legitimate objective."
V. Procedures Applicable to the
Adoption of Technical Regulations
Article 2 of the TBT Agreement specifies a number
of requirements that central government bodies
must satisfy in adopting technical regulations.
These requirements provide a roadmap that is
designed to ensure that technical regulations are
not unduly trade restrictive. At this time, given the
lack of precise indications of how technical regula-
tions would be formulated, only general comment
can be provided on the procedures that are neces-
sary to ensure TBT Agreement compliant regula-
tions.
1. Nondiscrimination
Article 2.1 requires Members to ensure that techni-
cal regulations do not discriminate between import-
ed and domestic like products, or among imports
from different WTO Member States. This obliga-
tion, which is parallel to the national treatment
obligation of GATT Article 111.4, is dealt with in sec-
tion 4, supra.
19 For example, assume that the US intensity limit for beams is
based on the predominant EAF method. Foreign beams which are
often produced in the BOF process could not meet the limit even
though the products are the same metallurgically and competi-
tive in price and customer perception. Therefore, there would be
a clear discrimination against the foreign BOF beams that are
like domestic EAF beams if the US based the technical regulation
on the emissions from EAF production.
20 Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate
Body, WTO-Docs. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1 O/AB/R,
WT/DS1 1/AB/R, p. 22.
21 See, EC- Asbestos, supra, note 10, at paras. 88-91.
22 Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and
Internal Sale of Cigarettes, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO
Doc. WT/DS302/AB/R, para. 96.
CCLR 112008 Maximum Carbon Intensity Limitations and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1 49
2. No Unnecessary Obstacle to Trade
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement states that techni-
cal regulations must not be "prepared, adopted or
applied with a view to or with the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade."
Moreover, technical regulations must not be more
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legiti-
mate objective (including, but not limited to, pro-
tection of human health or safety, animal or plant
life or health, or the environment), taking account
of the risks non-fulfillment would create. In assess-
ing such risks, relevant elements to consider are,
inter alia, available scientific and technical infor-
mation, related processing technology, or intended
end-uses of products.
There is no doubt that the objective of carbon
intensity regulations would be considered legiti-
mate, given the statement of objectives in TBT
Agreement Article 2.2 ("[s]uch legitimate objectives
are ... protection of human health or safety ... or the
environment") and the declaration in the Preamble
that Members have the right to take measures to
protect the environment and human health.
Available scientific and technical information all
point to emission of greenhouse gases as a signifi-
cant threat to the environment and human health.
Assuming the objective is legitimate, the regula-
tion must also meet the "no more trade restrictive
than necessary" requirement of Article 2.2, taking
into account the risks of nonfulfillment. Carbon
intensity regulations would, of course, be trade
restrictive, as they would entirely bar sale in US
commerce of imported products that did not meet
the standards or applicable exceptions. Thus, the
question to be resolved is whether such measures
are more trade restrictive than necessary.
While this specific provision has never been the
subject of a WTO panel or Appellate Body decision,
there are numerous decisions based on GATT 1994
Article XX (b), which provides an exception for
measures "necessary to protect human, animal or
23 United States -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 30. Although the Appellate Body upheld
this principle, it found the specific measures at issue to violate
the GATT, principally because they were applied in a discrimina-
tory fashion.
24 Korea Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen
Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS1 61/AB/R,
para. 159.
25 EC- Asbestos, supra, note 10, para. 172.
plant life or health" so long as they are not a dis-
guised restriction on international trade. In con-
struing the Chapeau of Article XX, the Appellate
Body appears to have upheld the principle that the
US could unilaterally require other countries to
adopt certain policies (in the case under considera-
tion, the adoption of measures to ensure turtle
friendly shrimp harvesting), where those policies
were comparable in effectiveness. 23 This reading
would suggest by analogy that carbon intensity reg-
ulations would be judged by whether they would
require foreign governments to adopt regulations
or policies with comparable effectiveness to the US
measure.
It must be remembered, though, that the TBT
Agreement does not have an analogue provision to
GATT 1994, Article XX. Moreover, in evaluating
trade restrictiveness under TBT Agreement Article
2.2, Members are entitled to take into account the
risk of non-fulfillment of the objectives of a techni-
cal regulation, which together with the TBT
Agreement's Preamble emphasis on the right of
Members to take measures to protect the environ-
ment or human health, indicate that a more relaxed
application of the trade restrictive test would be
appropriate in evaluating a carbon intensity regula-
tion under the TBT Agreement.
It does seem likely that the Appellate Body
would want an analysis of whether there are rea-
sonably available measures that would achieve the
same objective with less of an impact on trade. In
Korea - Beef,24 the Appellate Body noted that to
determine if an alternative measure is reasonably
available, factors to be taken into account are diffi-
culty of implementation and the extent to which
any alternative measure would contribute to the
objective pursued. In addition, the Appellate Body
in EC - Asbestos noted that the "more vital or
important [the] interests or values pursued", the
"easier it would be to accept as necessary measures
designed to achieve those ends."25 There is no ques-
tion concerning the urgency of the need to take
measures to deal with global warming, which
should increase the likelihood that carbon intensity
regulations would be acceptable.
The alternatives to a carbon intensity technical
regulation would include a carbon intensity tax,
which is politically difficult and would raise prob-
lems under GATT Article 111.2, or a cap-and-trade
system, which would seem to pose more questions
under the GATT than a regulation that is consistent
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with the TBT Agreement. Most commentators rec-
ognize that a cap-and-trade regime applied to
imports would likely require an exception under
GATT Article XX (b) and its chapeau. In these cir-
cumstances, the "necessary" test under the TBT
Agreement would likely survive Appellate Body
scrutiny.
We recognize that in decisions under the SPS
Agreement, WTO Panels and the Appellate Body
have not exhibited a high degree of deference to the
determinations of national regulators that meas-
ures covered by the Agreement have the requisite
scientific basis. Unlike the SPS Agreement, which
requires that measures be "based on scientific prin-
ciples and not maintained without sound sufficient
scientific evidence," the TBT Agreement requires
only "consideration" of scientific evidence. Thus, it
is likely to be easier to justify a measure with an
uncertain scientific basis under the TBT Agree-
ment.
3. Based on International Standards
Article 2.4 requires that existing international stan-
dards be utilized, unless they would be ineffective
for the purposes and objectives pursued. There are
no known carbon intensity limitations that could
be used as a model. There is the Kyoto Protocol,
which sets targets for overall greenhouse gas emis-
sions, but it expires in 2012 and is not product or
process specific. Indeed, there is no international
consensus on the best approach to controlling
greenhouse gases. While Article 2.5 provides that
regulations based on international standards enjoy
a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the
requirements of Article 2.2, the lack of such stan-
dards does not preclude adoption of regulations
that otherwise comply with the TBT Agreement.
4. Equivalent Standards
Members shall give positive consideration to
accepting as equivalent technical regulations of
other Members, even if these regulations differ
from their own, provided they are satisfied that
these regulations adequately fulfill the objectives of
their own regulations. Here again, there are no
alternate regulations that could be used as the basis
for a US regulation.
5. Performance-based
Wherever appropriate, Members shall specify tech-
nical regulations based on product requirements in
terms of performance. As envisioned, the intensity
carbon regulation would specify a benchmark, leav-
ing it to the regulated industries to determine how
best to achieve compliance.
VI. Procedural Requirements
In addition to the substantive requirements des-
cribed above, the TBT Agreement imposes a num-
ber of procedural requirements relating to the
promulgation of technical regulations that are sub-
ject to the Agreement. None of these requirements
appear to be problematic. They are described below,
however, to indicate the steps that must be followed
in order to promulgate the carbon intensity regula-
tion in a manner consistent with the TBT Agree-
ment.
A Member preparing, adopting or applying a
technical regulation which may have a significant
effect on trade of other Members is required by
Article 2.9, upon the request of another Member, to
explain the justification for that technical regula-
tion in terms of the provisions of the TBT
Agreement.
Except in urgent situations, for technical regula-
tions that are not based on a relevant international
standard, Article 2.9 requires Members to publish a
notice in a publication at an early appropriate stage,
in such a manner as to enable interested parties in
other Members to become acquainted with the pro-
posal. It is also required that other Members be
notified, through the Secretariat, of the products to
be covered by the proposed technical regulation,
together with a brief indication of its objective and
rationale. Such notifications shall take place at an
early appropriate stage, when amendments can still
be introduced and comments taken into account.
Upon request, other Members must be provided
with particulars or copies of the proposed technical
regulation together with identification of the parts
which in substance deviate from relevant interna-
tional standards. Finally, it is required to allow rea-
sonable time for other Members to make comments
in writing, discuss these comments upon request,
and take these written comments and the results of
these discussions into account.
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Except in those urgent circumstances, Article 2.12
requires Members to allow a reasonable interval
between the publication of technical regulations
and their entry into force in order to allow time for
producers in exporting Members, and particularly
in developing country Members, to adapt their
products or methods of production to the require-
ments of the importing Member.
VlI. Differential Treatment
for Developing Countries
Like many of the other WTO Agreements, the TBT
Agreement provides for special and differential
treatment of developing and least developed coun-
tries. Specifically, Article 12.3 of the TBT Agree-
ment provides that "Members shall, in the prepara-
tion and application of technical regulations, stan-
dards and conformity assessment procedures, take
account of the special development, financial and
trade needs of developing country Members, with a
view to ensuring that such technical regulations,
standards and conformity assessment procedures
do not create unnecessary obstacles to exports from
developing country Members."
Because compliance with carbon intensity stan-
dards may pose particular difficulties for at least
some developing country Members of the WTO,
this provision may potentially come into play in
any challenge. It is not clear what, precisely, this
provision requires, as neither it, nor any other pro-
vision of the WTO Agreements relating to special
treatment of developing countries, has been the
subject of WTO dispute settlement decisions. In
any event, the application of Article 12.3 would not
appear to require differential treatment where
development of industrial sectors is not restricted
26 Ibid., para. 152 (emphasis omitted).
27 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO
Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R.
28 See the discussion of this issue in Hudec, "The Product-Process
Doctrine in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence'", in Bronckers/Quick
(eds.), New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in
Honour of John H. Jackson, The Hague 2000, p. 1 8.
29 See, EC -Asbestos, supra. In that connection, see also
Marceau/Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement,
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade A Map of the World
Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods", Jour-
nal of World Trade 2002, at 811. The authors suggest a narrow
reading of "like" in the TBT Agreement given its purposes.
by lack of capital or limited access to the latest tech-
nologies.
VIII. A Measure Justified Under
the TBT Agreement Would Not Be
Required to Meet GATT 1994
Assuming that a carbon intensity regulation would
be a characteristic appropriate for regulation under
the TBT Agreement, it is next necessary to evaluate
whether other GATT-1994 obligations, particularly
Article III, would also be applicable. In EC -
Asbestos, the Appellate Body stated that the TBT
Agreement "imposes obligations on Members that
seem to be different from, and additional to, the
obligations imposed on Members under the GATT
1994."26 Moreover, in EC - Bananas, the Appellate
Body concluded that a measure could violate both
the Services Agreement and GATT 1994.27
As an initial matter, it is clear that carbon inten-
sity regulations would be non-product related
PPMs. There is authority that such measures are
not consistent with Article III of GATT-1994 to the
extent that they apply different requirements to
like products.28 This so-called product-process
method doctrine, which derives from an interpreta-
tion of the ad-note to Article III, is said to prohibit
regulations based on the production process that
have no effect on the intrinsic characteristics of the
product. Under this definition, it seems clear that
regulations limiting the level of carbon emitted in
the production process would be considered a PPM,
since the physical properties of the finished prod-
uct are not affected by the emissions involved.
Moreover, in the case of steel, EAF products are like
BOF products under the standard tests.
29
Given the probability that different carbon inten-
sity regulations would be necessary for certain
basic products that are nevertheless like, such regu-
lations would appear to be inconsistent with GATT
1994, Article III, as interpreted by the decisions that
set forth the PPM doctrine. Therefore, it would be
necessary, assuming that GATT 1994 is applicable,
to resort to Article XX, which provides general
exceptions to the GATT 1994 obligations for other-
wise inconsistent measures that not unjustifiably
discriminatory or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade. There is speculation that the Appel-
late Body decision in the US - Shrimp Products dis-
pute, which dealt with an interpretation of Article
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XX, seems to implicitly endorse a unilaterally
applied PPM that differentiated shrimps based on
the method of capture.30 However, analysis of the
extent to which a carbon intensity regulation would
be deemed compliant with the chapeau of Article
XX would not be necessary if the regulation is not
required to conform to GATT 1994 on the ground
that the TBT Agreement takes precedence.
A strong case can be made that compliance with
the TBT Agreement should be the exclusive WTO
obligation that would apply to a compliant techni-
cal regulation. In the first place, the basic principles
concerning national treatment set out in GATT
1994 Article III are also embodied in Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement. This suggests that the drafters
intended that the Article 2.1 requirement be the
only national treatment obligation. Moreover, TBT
Agreement Article 2.2 requires members to ensure
that technical regulations "are not prepared, adopt-
ed or applied ... with the effect of creating unneces-
sary obstacles to international trade." Nor should
such measures be more "trade-restrictive than nec-
essary to fulfill a legitimate objective". Given these
constraints that are internal to the TBT Agreement,
it would be redundant to also require compliance of
a technical regulation with GATT 1994.
This analysis is buttressed by an interpretative
note to the Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization, 3 1 which provides that "[I]n the event
of conflict between a provision of the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provi-
sion of another agreement [e.g., the TBT Agree-
ment] ... the provision of the other agreement shall
prevail to the extent of the conflict."
32
The TBT Agreement is in conflict with the GATT
on a key point. As we have noted, and the EC -
Asbestos and EC - Sardines cases confirm, the TBT
Agreement applies to characteristics that are not
intrinsic to the product, an interpretation that per-
mits technical regulations that are process based.
Thus, assuming the validity of the PPM doctrine as
applied to GATT 1994 Article III, application of this
doctrine to a technical regulation that meets all
other TBT Agreement requirements would result in
clear conflict with the TBT Agreement. Therefore, a
regulation under the TBT Agreement that meets its
requirements would prevail over a contrary appli-
cation of GATT 1994 Article III.
Finally, it would appear incumbent on the
Appellate Body to interpret the relevant agree-
ments to give maximum effect to both the TBT
Agreement and the GATT. This principle would be
obviated if a regulation sanctioned under the TBT
Agreement were to be invalidated because of an
aggressive interpretation of Article III under the
guise of the PPM doctrine. This would conflict
with the "principles of effective interpretation pur-
suant to which all provisions of a treaty ... must be
given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of
words."33 Moreover, "an interpreter is not free to
adopt a reading that would result in reducing
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redun-
dancy or inutility."34 As noted above, "a narrow
selection" of process-based regulations are permit-
ted under the TBT Agreement, even if there is a
question about their appropriateness under GATT
Article III. As such, those regulations, assuming
they are fully compliant with the TBT Agreement,
should not be subject to redundant requirements
of GATT 1994.
IX. Conclusion
A very compelling case can be made that the regu-
lation of greenhouse gas emissions by technical reg-
ulations would be consistent with the TBT
Agreement, assuming the procedural requirements
for the adoption of such regulations were scrupu-
lously observed. While such regulations would be
restrictive of trade, the TBT Agreement specifically
30 See CUTS Briefing Paper No. 7/2000 at 4, Process and Produc-
tion Methods (PPMs) Implications for Developing Countries;
R053 ISEAL CIEL Legal Opinion, July 2006, at 4, 6. ("The
Appellate Body appeared to suggest that it was not the extraterri-
torial application of US environmental standards that violated
WTO rules in this case, but the arbitrary manner in which the US
law was applied.")
31 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
33 I.L.M. (1994), p. 1144 ff.
32 Ibid., Annex 1A, General Interpretative Note,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final-e.htm, which
states that in "the event of a conflict between a provision of [the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of
another agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing
the WTO], the provision of [the other] agreement shall prevail to
the extent of the conflict."
33 Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
Report of the Panel, WTO Docs. WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R,
WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para. 14.28.
34 United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc.
WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 21; see generally Pauwelyn, "The Role of
Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?",
American Journal of International Law 2001, p. 535 ff.
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defines protection of the environment and human
health as legitimate objectives of technical meas-
ures, and allows consideration of the risk of non-
fulfillment of such objectives in their adoption.
Given the magnitude of the world-wide effects of
global warming, and their likely effectiveness, car-
bon intensity regulations would not seem to be an
unnecessary restraint on trade.
